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The multitude and the machine 
Productivism, populism, posthumanism 
 
Frederick Harry Pitts University of Bristol 
 
Abstract 
There has been a proliferating literature on postcapitalist and post-work futures in recent years, underpinned 
by policy proposals like the basic income and a reduction in working hours. It has gained increasing uptake 
within left electoral politics and policymaking. The generational potency of these ideas require that we 
understand their theoretical roots. This contribution considers the interplay between the work of Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri and the new postcapitalism exemplified by the likes of Paul Mason and Aaron 
Bastani, as well as its relationship with intellectual currents around Corbynism and the wider contemporary 
left. Through a discussion of their latest book, Assembly, it will be seen that Hardt and Negri both inform 
and are increasingly informed by the postcapitalist and post-work thinking popular on the left today – in 
particular at its ‘posthumanist’ fringes. However, this recent work is characterised by a series of tactical 
redirections that rather than indicating renewal reflect the potential collapse of this utopian framework for 
the future in the face of a rapidly unravelling global political context. Whilst the determinist understanding 
of social transformation cannot permit these setbacks, this shines a light on more general shifts in left 
strategy and analysis. 
 
Introduction 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s now long-running series of books on the development 
of political power and resistance in contemporary capitalism have had a recurring and 
sometimes surprising relationship of influence and reflection with radical left politics over 
the past twenty years. Empire and Multitude combined eulogies to the transformative 
potential of the New Economy with a theorisation of the alterglobalisation struggles 
ensuing at the turn of the millennium.1 Commonwealth and Declaration, meanwhile, 
traced the emergence of the post-crisis social movements that took the horizontalist 
politics of those earlier struggles into public spaces and popular imaginaries.2 Hardt and 
Negri’s works have both tracked and trained successive generations of radicals, 
conceptualising and informing what have largely been extraparliamentary experiments in 
grassroots alternatives.  
Most recently, however, the themes running through their work of the technological 
affordances of contemporary capitalism for new forms of networked political subjectivity 
and the potential for a postcapitalist transformation have propelled themselves into the 
political mainstream through the futurist fringe of the new transatlantic electoralist left 
arranged around Jeremy Corbyn and, to a lesser extent perhaps, Bernie Sanders.3 
Aspects of how Hardt and Negri understand the work of Karl Marx – specifically his 
techno-utopian ‘Fragment on Machines’ – and Spinoza – the theorisation of a new class 
subject, the ‘multitude’, that compels capitalist development – resonate in a fresh strand 
of post-work, post-capitalism, sometimes post-humanist left thinking around automation, 




particular there is a close interplay between the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
and the new postcapitalism or ‘fully automated luxury communism’ exemplified by the 
likes of Paul Mason and Aaron Bastani, as well as its relationship with intellectual currents 
around Corbynism and the wider contemporary left.5 In Assembly, the latest instalment in 
Hardt and Negri’s continuing engagement with capitalism and its alternatives in the 
contemporary time, the authors absorb some of the insights of the new thinking they 
helped nurture.6 Whilst this hardens the technologically determinist and post-humanist 
tenor of their work, the interweaving of this imaginary with an electoralist ‘institutional turn’ 
brings Hardt and Negri to distance themselves from the horizontalist politics absorbed 
and informed in their previous works – with some surprising if ultimately unsatisfactory 
results.7 Indeed, these tactical redirections , rather than indicating renewal, reflect the 
potential collapse of this utopian framework for the future in the face of a rapidly 
unravelling global political context. Whilst their determinist understanding of social 
transformation cannot permit these setbacks, this turning point shines a light on more 
general shifts in left strategy and analysis. 
 
Multitude and machinic assemblages 
Assembly begins with an empirical assessment of the contemporary conditions of labour 
and production that resonates through the rest of the book’s wider political and economic 
arguments (xix-xx). This assessment will be familiar to readers of any of Hardt and Negri’s 
seminal series of previous works, where it performs, although sometimes with different 
stresses and language, a similar function in setting up the wider lines of argumentation 
that follow. First, they state, contemporary capitalism is dependent on forms of ‘social and 
natural wealth’ initially shared in common but increasingly expropriated and valorised by 
capital. This implies that capitalism is an alien imposition on a pre-existing, prelapsarian 
naturalness that in some way survives, withstanding subsumption.8 Secondly, the 
dependence of capital upon the common is expressed in the changing face of labour, the 
hegemonic forms of which exhibit cooperation, knowledge, care, affect and creativity to a 
much greater degree than in previous economic settlements. This, for Hardt and Negri, 
draws from the common and creates new commons insofar as it works from and on the 
production and reproduction of human relationships. This also grants labour a degree of 
autonomy from ‘capitalist command’ insofar as it is ‘animated’ by life beyond the 
workplace and the employment relationship. Third, technological developments like digital 
algorithms are decentralising the capacity to gather and store knowledge such that 
networked young workers create and appropriate their own forms of ‘fixed capital’ pivotal 
to the kind of capitalist production Hardt and Negri see as decisive today. Fourth, this shift 
from traditional industries to business models based on the extraction of value from the 
common, whether natural or social, is not necessarily one where the latter becomes 
quantitatively dominant but rather a story of the qualitative significance of certain forms of 
activity and industry. Fifth and final, these changes at the productive base of capitalist 
society cascade upwards to impact upon how power governs and how resistance is 
organised, granting the latter autonomy and independence by means of the ‘multitude’ of 
digital and immaterial labourers who work with and upon the common, and the former a 




A distinctive feature of Assembly that gives a hint towards the dual human and non-human 
allusions of the book’s title is the reimagining of the multitude’s heterogeneous political 
subjectivity along the lines of the ‘machinic assemblages’ taken to characterise 
contemporary capitalism. This marks a development of Hardt and Negri’s work that, like 
the turn to political organisation and electoral politics elsewhere in the book (276), seems 
to respond to how some of the same ideas Hardt and Negri have been working with 
previously have been picked up and applied by left movements and intellectuals in recent 
years, acquiring new resonances. The Spinozian ‘plane of immanence’ on which Hardt 
and Negri situated social actors and phenomena in earlier works reappears today in the 
ontological equivalence accelerationists and post-humanists posit between human and 
non-human entities – whether people, machines, plants, animals, inanimate objects and 
so on (122).9 Through a combination of the Silicon Valley search for technological 
singularity and the application of its academic abstractions in a reinvigorated left-wing 
political sphere sensing possibility in a technological future, this way of framing the world 
has attained a real and possibly dangerous social and material dynamism in the present 
day.  
Where the multitude names the collection of human ‘singularities’ Hardt and Negri have 
previously seen as politically pivotal, in Assembly they laud the transformative possibility 
of machinic assemblages as collections of both human and non-human singularities. For 
Hardt and Negri, machinic assemblages connect human and non-human beings on a 
plane of ontological equivalence, recognising the ‘subjective’ character of both living and 
non-living things (122). What makes these assemblages radically transformative for Hardt 
and Negri is their absorption of ‘young people today’ whose ‘existence is resistance’ and 
productive of ‘subjectivity and forms of life’ (123). A key respect in which humans are 
brought into the fold of the forces of production for Hardt and Negri is the manner in which 
networked young workers today create and engage their own ‘fixed capital’ through the 
mobile information and communication technologies dispersed into their hands, 
concentrating knowledge and cooperative capacity (238). Bearers of an autonomous 
productive input all of their own, they thus assume their place in the digital-human 
assemblage Hardt and Negri associate with the contemporary forces of production; 
simultaneously, the same ‘fixed capital’ is ‘integrated into workers’ bodies and minds and 
becomes their second nature’ (119).  
Whereas the earlier presentation of the ‘multitude’ similarly theorised its transformative 
possibility around the immeasurably productive character of the immaterial labour it 
performed – the production of subjectivity and forms of life there relating to the kinds of 
work typical of the nascent New Economy in fields like the creative industries – here the 
transformative possibility of the machinic assemblages is theorised around the 
immeasurably productive character of what Hardt and Negri label here ‘algorithmic labour’ 
centring on the ‘new’ New Economy of digital platforms and gig work. For instance, 
whereas once they ascribed to immaterial labour a tightening feedback loop between 
production and consumption, they can now read into platforms like Google and Facebook 
the extension of this as users become autonomous producers of data valorised by the 
firm (119). 
In an adaptation of the orthodox Marxist understanding of the unfolding of capitalist 




capitalism (109) represent what might be characterised as the ‘forces of production’ which 
push against the ‘relations of production’ - namely, the property relations that conflict with 
the common, cooperative basis of value production in the digital age. As Hardt and Negri 
write, 
Private property appears increasingly as a fetter to social productivity both in the 
sense that it blocks the relationships of cooperation that generate production and 
that it undermines the social relations that are its result. (147) 
Somewhat at odds with the rejection of dialectics elsewhere in Hardt and Negri’s work,this 
is a classic restatement of the traditional Marxist ‘fetters’ view of history whereby the 
forces have an a priori agency constrained by the imposition upon them of capitalist social 
relations. The relations are reshaped through the development of the forces as the former 
become insufficient relative to the latter, such that ‘[c]apitalist developments in logistics 
are always a response to the rebellious, uncontrollable forces of production’ (177-8). 
By a theoretical sleight of hand, however, Hardt and Negri combine the Marxist orthodoxy 
of the fetters view of history with the legacy of Italian operaismo’s ‘copernican inversion’, 
whereby capitalist development is seen as driven by class struggle (76).10 Rolling the 
multitude into the technological forces, capitalist social relations themselves are seen as 
mere ‘reactions to resistance and revolt’ on the part of autonomous human agents, whose 
labour is rendered ontologically prior to and independent of its secondary engagement by 
capital through the capture of the value it creates after the fact (155, 117). Whereas the 
forces of production have typically been seen as consisting of ‘fixed capital’ - machines 
and the knowledge encoded in them - here the forces are expanded to encapsulate 
human life itself. This is because humans and machines are not opposed forces but 
‘belong to the same ontological plane’. ‘Human culture’ is no barrier to ‘supposedly 
inhuman’ technologies, but the two are intertwined (110). It is necessary, Hardt and Negri 
suggest, for humans to enrol themselves into the forces of production through immersion 
in ‘the heart of technologies’ against the relations that dominate and expropriate the 
results of the immense productivity of algorthmic labour and digitally-enabled social 
cooperation (111).  
The difference between Hardt and Negri’s negated dialectic of forces and relations and 
that found in orthodox Marxism is that for the former there is no promise of resolution or 
unification out of the social conflict and resistance that powers it, only ‘permanent crisis 
and continual imbalance’ (75-6). This, it is fair to say, foolproofs what was formerly, in 
Empire and Multitude, the sense that a new world was being built in the shell of the old, 
and were only it to be liberated from the relations constraining it, all would be well. 
Moreover, Hardt and Negri appear keen to distance themselves from the uptake of their 
ideas in the fashioning of schemes for imminent automated utopias and the like, noting 
that the tendency of machines is not to liberate humans from work but to create new and 
more routinised forms of work that render the worker more like a machine than a human. 
The digital age has only exacerbated these tendencies by facilitating a ‘Digital Taylorism’ 
just as rationalising as the original. Meanwhile, they suggest, the chances of ‘computer 
systems, artificial intelligence, and algorithms’ rendering human labour obsolete 
altogether are also mitigated by the incapacity of the technology as currently constituted 
to perform a whole host of tasks necessary to the performance of most existing jobs (131). 




accomplish things alone. But it sees no alternative in a humanist response to the issue. 
Instead they sense revolutionary possibility in the combination of human and 
technological factors; a dynamic assemblage wherein each reshapes the other. 
 
Productivism and populism 
The productivist understanding of labour and value that permeates Hardt and Negri’s 
account (94) has a political significance insofar as it celebrates and seeks the extension 
and reward of the multitude’s productiveness through social cooperation, access to 
knowledge, the commoning of resources and wealth and the combination of human and 
non-human forces in the digital age (xvi). As far as Hardt and Negri see it, the issue faced 
is the insufficiency of current property relations to properly recognise and accommodate 
the social and ‘common’ character of production (94). In the context of these property 
relations, Hardt and Negri pose the multitude as a productive majority ruled over by ‘an 
extreme minority’ that leeches upon the value they create (xviii). In this respect the 
multitude resembles a postmodern version of the ‘people’ of which populist politics 
purports to be the representative. Indeed, they claim not to ‘doubt the sincerity or 
intelligence of many right-wing activists’ protests against the elites of finance, global 
institutions and national government’, suggesting that there are elements of this populism 
that ‘could be recuperated by intelligent left-wing movements’ because they mark an 
attack on the forms of property that Hardt and Negri identify as being responsible for 
plundering the productiveness of the multitude (52) – in much the same way as populisms 
of left and right posit various parasitical forces leeching on the national people from 
outside. In this, they follow contemporary political rhetoric in drawing sharp divides 
between productive and unproductive social actors: 
On one side are all those who live on the interest generated by the financial 
markets and seek to preserve exclusive access to the private property they 
accumulate. On the other side are those who produce social wealth through their 
collective knowledges, their intelligence, and their social capacities to 
communicate, care for, and cooperate with each other, who seek security through 
free and open access to the common they have produced. These are battle lines. 
(175) 
This kind of friend-enemy, inside-outside binary distinction is central to the age of 
populism – and the coincidence between the terms of the distinction, resting as they do 
on the rightful inheritance of what is produced against parasitical outside forces – plays 
with fire politically, bearing a structural similarity to anti-welfare, anti-migrant, anti-rentier, 
anti-globalist and conspiracist anti-finance binary rhetoric. There is a common format 
driving the claims made on value across the political spectrum. This being said, Hardt and 
Negri are at pains to stress how the ‘multitude’ is not a synonym for the people, but a 
radical completion of the impossible project of populism, which depends upon ‘the fantasy 
of a unified people’ (35). Indeed, where they criticise contemporary populism it is for the 
tendency of populist political projects to ossify social movements in state power, and not 
in anything specific to the propagation of a popular will in and of itself (23).  
Where Hardt and Negri accept the need for the seizure and wielding of power it can be 




narrowing of the relationship between ‘rulers and ruled’ (289) - a demand that in itself 
mirrors the relationship between charismatic strongman leaders and the hardworking 
national communities they purport to represent. In this relationship, the overarching 
strategy is set by the led with the leader responsible only for its ‘tactical execution’ (291). 
How far this could hold in an age of authoritarian populism and one in which unpredictable 
desires are expressed at the ballot box, or in referenda, is another question. More widely, 
there is a rejection of representation of all kinds in Assembly, and specifically of 
representative democracy and its institutions (5-6, 31-2, 37, 289). Associated with this is 
a tech-positive appreciation of how information and knowledge exchange have been 
opened up in the contemporary age (128) - an innovation that has arguably presented 
deleterious consequences for public understanding and debate, with conspiracy theories, 
genocide denialism and healthcare quackery all following in the wake of the populist 
ascendancy. This is a politics of removing limits, of removing boundaries, of removing 
processes that translate immediacy into something mediated. 
In this way the demands for direct democracy and openness to different forms and modes 
of knowledge – demands which echo from their previous work through the post-crisis 
social movements that terminated in the present electoralist return to representation on 
the left – is underpinned by a wider attack on the concept and practice of mediation in 
Hardt and Negri’s work, in favour of a radical immediacy. This is in part ontological, insofar 
as the Spinozian immanence at the heart of their worldview rejects dialectical 
understandings of a mediated reality.11 And it is in part political insofar as their worldview 
rejects forms of political mediation - for instance, where, in Assembly, it is claimed that 
politics is just a ‘surface’ that obscures from view what really matters in social life itself 
(xv), or where Hardt and Negri ridicule the kind of impersonal ‘mediatory apparatus’ that 
typifies power and the suspension of social conflict in bourgeois society (125-127). The 
former ontological rejection of mediation has a philosophical basis – seeing reality itself 
as untouched by mediation – and a historical basis in that the networked sociality and 
cooperation of contemporary production resist organisation and representation (37). For 
instance, whereas money performed a mediating function vis-a-vis class struggle under 
Keynesianism, it can no longer mediate the ‘uncontained, overflowing force’ of the power 
multitude wields, which ‘wells up from the field of social conflict’, exceeding all limits (189, 
81).  
 
From spontaneity to organisation 
The question is whether mediation can be done away with so easily – are not the 
‘assembly’ forms of politics associated with Hardt and Negri’s thought themselves 
mediations, just different ones? And is unmediated experience and social life even 
possible at all? Interestingly, Assembly presents a politics of institution-building and 
‘antagonistic reformism’ that, contrary to the book’s philosophical claims, trades in new 
and alternative mediations of the individual, society and the state. 
One of the striking features of Hardt and Negri’s Assembly is the shift from a politics based 
on the spontaneous resistance of the multitude to one based on its concerted 
organisation. The multitude appeared in their earlier work as an inchoate and limitless 




encapsulate everyone and everything, whilst retaining the essential position of the 
proletariat in classical Marxist theory as an ontologically and epistemologically privileged 
revolutionary subject – something affirmed in Assembly through a sympathetic discussion 
of Lukacs’s defence of orthodoxy (73-4). Identified as the positive force driving capitalist 
development, the likes of Empire and Multitide placed few boundaries upon what could 
and could not be associated with the agentic energy of the multitude. However, as the 
hype of the New Economy and the new social movements that accompanied it subsides 
for an altogether bleaker global picture, Assembly sees this narrative hedged. Here, the 
multitude ‘designates a radical diversity of social subjectivities that do not spontaneously 
form together but instead require a political project to organize’ (69). This means 
‘constructing the multitude “institutionally,” that is, transforming the social experience of 
the multitude into political institutions’ (133). For a theoretical worldview previously 
presupposed on an attack on mediation in the name of immediacy, this marks a significant 
step change not only from Hardt and Negri’s earlier work, but also from the way it has 
been received and applied among the contemporary left.  
Early on in Assembly, Hardt and Negri state that it is a mistake to translate critiques of 
leadership into a refusal to institutionalise power; and a mistake to replace verticality with 
an unstructured horizontality (xiv). Hardt and Negri write that their own theoretical insights 
‘have been cited to support a generalized refusal of organization’. They bemoan the way 
in which their analyses of the changing quality of labour in contemporary capitalism have 
led scholars to see a spontaneous resistance inherent in the productive activities of the 
multitude with no need for organisation and institutionalisation. They even distance 
themselves from the translation of the concept of immanence that dominates their 
previous work into a ‘refusal of all norms and organizational structures’ and a voluntaristic 
individualism (7). In a significant development from the likes of Empire and Multitude, they 
ask us to focus not on spontaneity itself but the structures and work that makes it possible 
(21). 
This appears aimed at adherents of the earlier works, but in reality retrospectively tracks 
the existing trajectories of the left radicals who owe the most to Hardt and Negri’s earlier 
work. From Seattle through to Occupy through to Corbyn and Sanders, we have 
witnessed an anti-statist, anti-national, horizontalist and globalist inclination give way to a 
new settlement with the attempted seizure of state power through party-led electoral 
projects operating within a national frame of reference posed against the global as an 
expression of capitalist power – from ‘changing the world without taking power’ to a 
realisation that ‘in order to change the world we need to take power’ (69). As Hardt and 
Negri put it, the aim of this new left is to ‘create a model of constituent democracy in which 
differences are able to interact and together create new institutions: against global capital, 
against the dictatorship of finance, against the biopowers that destroy the earth, against 
racial hierarchies, and for access to and self-management of the common’. The 
institutional turn represents a break with the prefigurative politics Hardt and Negri in part 
helped inspire, which they themselves now criticise as overly focused on the ‘creation and 
reproduction of the community of activists’ as the crucible of political action, uprooted from 
the realities of the world around them, and hamstrung by a moralistic culture of ‘internal 
policing’ (275) – tendencies arguably left intact with the transition of a generation of 




The apparent irony of the trajectory of ‘constituent power’ towards electoralism and 
institutions frames Assembly’s attempt to bring coherence to what in reality has been a 
pragmatic response on the part of the left to a series of contingencies and wider political 
trends, namely the failure of the post-crisis protest movements and the sublation of their 
critical and organisational characteristics within an insurgent national populism on left and 
right. The trouble with this is that once one takes an immanentist view of all social 
principles united on a plane of ontological equivalence, and grants parties or 
organisations the power to lead and command this ‘multitude’, it becomes very hard to 
reconcile what falls outside or afoul it. The volte face in Assembly away from spontaneity, 
horizontalism and voluntarism and towards organisation, centralisation and leadership 
runs the risk of applying the underpinning philosophy to practical problems in such a way 
as to render more and not less potent its defects. If Hardt and Negri really do stand by 
their earlier work’s advocacy of immediacy and immanence against mediation and the 
dialectical playing out of contradictions, granting leaders and organisational structures 
primacy within this heady political mix would appear to suggest a kind of personalised, 
charismatic politics the likes of which are already in the ascendency the world over under 
the banner of authoritarian populism. 
The turn towards structure and organization comes not completely out of the blue in the 
context of Hardt and Negri’s wider output. Even in Empire, the powerful argument 
climaxed in the recommendation of policies like a universal basic income that implied the 
seizure of some measure of power in capitalist society. But where in Empire such 
demands jarred with the tenor of the rest of the book – an attack on old-school projects 
for state power winding up in the relatively timid call for radical instantiations of it – in 
Assembly the connection is more fully fleshed out, simultaneous with contemporary shifts 
on the actually-existing left that have accomplished a temporary resolution in practice of 
contradictions that were at the time of Empire largely theoretical. Hardt and Negri are here 
unabashed in their recommendation of ‘reformist action’ (256), with reform posed as a 
‘non-sovereign’ alternative to revolutionary search for sovereign power. 
Whilst the politics of prefiguration comes in for a bit of a hiding in Assembly, there is still 
a residual commitment to an open politics of ‘counter powers’ that would appear to reject 
the possibility of an authoritarian or totalitarian outcome of these tendencies (133). Hardt 
and Negri’s previous work cast a surprisingly positive light on capitalist transformation as 
an expression of the desires and creative drive of the multitude – tantamount to an 
affirmation of capitalist development that willed the acceleration rather than deceleration 
of political, economic and organisational change as onward steps toward a postcapitalist 
society lurking in the present. In the context of this well-established feature of their work, 
a major shift in tack in Assembly is the augmentation of a ‘project of subjectivication’ 
focused on ‘constituent power’ with one based on ‘destituent power’ - not a creative force 
propelling capitalist development but one sabotaging and pegging it back (223). However, 
the latter exists ultimately in service of the former by clearing the way of obstacles to what 
Hardt and Negri describe as ‘capacities for innovation’ - returning to an idea common in 
this literature that there are potentialities awaiting to be unleashed were it not for capitalist 
social relations (224). Accomplished with the assistance of destituent power, constituent 
power in turn ‘paves the way for a new constituted power’ that overturns the ‘relationship 
between representation and democracy’ by ‘reducing to a minimum the separation 




constituted power is presented as a three-prong strategy of exodus, withdrawing from 
dominant institutions; antagonistic reformism, transforming existing institutions; and 
hegemonic strategy, creating new institutions (274). 
Hardt and Negri’s theorisation of constituent power takes on a particularly persuasive light 
when associated with the ‘counterpower’ role assumed by ‘free worker institutions’ like 
unions in Fordist society, recommending that today too ‘democratic institutions must 
organize counterpowers and keen open and plural the developments of constituent 
power’ (289). Strip away the intellectual architecture, and this is a call for a strong and 
healthy civil society between the citizen and the state – a feature of liberal democracies 
increasingly at risk in the current time. Indeed, the citation of the New Deal– Roosevelt’s 
stimulation of labour organisation and collective bargaining a recurring theme in the 
operaist and postoperaist tradition – highlights how a model of counterpowers contains 
greater political possibilities than some of the other examples given like the Bolshevik 
revolution and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (254-55). It is presented as a straight-up 
means for capitalism to be reformed from below, and a path to possibly circumvent the 
historical association they note between traditional socialism and the simple seizing of an 
unreconstructed state power in the name of the ‘public’. Indeed, the call for ‘non-state 
public power’ (278) comprising ‘non-sovereign’ institutions resonates at a time where a 
one-sided view of sovereignty has such political significance.  
The translation of destituent power into constituent power, and constituent power into 
constituted power, is pitched around an assault on sovereignty – a buzzword of populists 
left and right – in the name of ‘nonsovereign’ institutions that retain the dynamic 
movement between power and plural counterpowers, and do not situate a sovereign 
power to rule over ‘society and the state’ (256-7). Whereas ‘the people or the nation or 
the proletariat can be sovereign […] when it speaks with one voice’, the pluralistic 
multitude ‘can never be sovereign’ (26) - an important clarification in light of how close 
the multitude runs to both the people and the proletariat. Citing the examples of ‘non-
sovereign’ power sought by the Kurds in Rojava or in the anticolonial self-determination 
projects of Aime Cesaire and Leopold Senghor (38-39), they also distance themselves 
from any connection with the political horizon of the nation-state throughout, much as in 
their previous work seeing it as insufficient to address the global character of the ‘capitalist 
world market’ (32-33, 263). This is associated with a wider critique of the statist turn on 
the contemporary left, which whilst ‘eminently pragmatic’ in their view, seeks an 
‘unrealistic’ alternative to ‘neoliberal globalization’ in the absence of the objective material 




The trouble with the concept of ‘constituent power’ driving societal change is that it is 
posited not merely as a ‘political insistence’ but rather as an ‘ontological consistency', 
which even ‘during periods of seeming calm’ is ‘accumulating potential like a battery 
storing up an electric charge in wait for its next release’ (36). The convenient claim that 
constituent power is always accomplishing itself even where and when it cannot be seen 




arc of history bends favourably towards the proletariat – the argument thus made, it 
becomes impossible to reasonably argue against it. The difference is that, as Hardt and 
Negri put it, this teleology is an ‘immanent teleology’ constructed from below (233). Those 
who would argue, meanwhile, and who might seek to offer a more tempered, less 
optimistic appreciation of the affordances of the present conjuncture, are dismissed by 
Hardt and Negri as akin to ‘some evil genius’ whispering in the collective ear that ‘the 
conditions in the world today are not propitious’ for the kind of hopeful politics Assembly 
presents (xvi). It might be said that Hardt and Negri’s tactical and strategic shifts in 
Assembly conceal the destruction of the utopian potentialities upon which their political 
framework has previously rested. But despite this conceptual collapse, the underlying 
theoretical understanding of historical and social change cannot allow for any sense of 
being set back by circumstances. 
Provocatively, Hardt and Negri present themselves as the realists in this context, because 
‘political realism consists in recognizing the tendency animated by the movements of 
contemporary society, illuminating the desires embedded in them’ (284). The trouble with 
this ‘realism’ and the movements it describes is its uprootedness from any empirical basis 
in a world going badly wrong. Whilst all around lose their heads, the ‘realists’ are usually 
claimed to be those Hardt and Negri dismiss as suggesting only a vital centre can ‘save 
democratic politics and its institutions from radical and irrational challenges’ (246). But 
Hardt and Negri would suggest that it is contrarily the idealistic route to recognise the 
political limits posed by this state of affairs, the rise of authoritarianism, nationalism and 
populism, and the generational defeat of liberalism and the left at the present time. If it is 
idealist to look out at the world unravelling and cast doubt on Hardt and Negri’s 
overexuberant claim that we have ‘finally managed to shrug off the rags of modernity’ 
(29), then so be it. Let the realists indulge a future that may or may not come – and leave 
the idealists to confront the present. 
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